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THE METAPHYSICAL BASES OF LIABILITY: 
COMMENTARY ON MICHAEL MOORE’S CAUSATION 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Christopher Hitchcock* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin by saying how much I enjoyed Professor Michael Moore’s 
thick, rich, and learned book.1 I learned a great deal from reading it, and 
recommend it to anyone with an interest in any of the three topics it covers: 
moral responsibility, legal liability, and the metaphysics of causation. It 
covers such a wide breadth of terrain that even the most expert readers will 
learn a great deal from it. It is also very clearly and engagingly written. 
While it is possible to break the book roughly into sections corresponding to 
the three problem areas of ethics, legal theory, and metaphysics,2 the real 
strength of the book lies in the interaction between these different topics. As 
a philosopher interested in the metaphysics of causation, I will focus my 
discussion on the last section of the book, but a discussion of the 
metaphysics that is divorced from the applications to ethics or legal theory 
would be impossible. 
The last seven chapters of the book more or less stand alone, in the sense 
that one could start reading at chapter fourteen and have little difficulty 
following the discussion. Indeed, anyone who is not familiar with the current 
state of play in the philosophical literature on causation would get a solid 
overview from reading these chapters. For specialists in the theory of 
                                                                                                                               
* Professor of Philosophy, California Institute of Technology. 
1. MICHAEL MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, 
AND METAPHYSICS (2009). 
2. Chapters two and three deal with ethics, chapters one and four through thirteen with 
legal theory, and chapters fourteen through twenty deal with metaphysics. Id. at 20–80, 3–19, 
81–326, 327–512. 
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causation, there is not much that is dramatically new by way of metaphysics 
(with one exception, which I will mention below). This is not intended as a 
criticism. Moore’s goal in these chapters is not to advance an original theory 
of the nature of causation, but rather to explore the range of proposals that 
are on offer, and to identify and defend the sort of account that he finds most 
plausible.3 The real payoff is not in the metaphysics per se, but in the 
intriguing discussions of the relationship between the metaphysics and moral 
and legal theory. 
My discussion will proceed as follows: I will begin with an altogether 
too brief summary of some of Moore’s main conclusions. I will then give a 
brief exposition of some of my own views on the nature of causation. I will 
then use these as a springboard to raise some specific challenges for 
Professor Moore. Some of these will be challenges to specific claims that 
Moore defends. Others will be broader in nature: they are, I think, deep 
problems for philosophy as a whole, but problems that are often hidden in 
discussions of the relationship between causation and responsibility.  
II.  HIGHLIGHTS 
It is, of course, impossible to do justice to a five hundred-page book in a 
short summary. I will attempt only to highlight some of Professor Moore’s 
main conclusions, with a bias toward those that will be the focus of the 
subsequent discussion.  
According to Moore, the primary function of criminal and tort law is to 
achieve justice: retributive justice in the case of criminal law, and corrective 
justice in the case of tort law.4 This is contrasted, for example, with the views 
of economically oriented jurists such as Coase,5 Calabresi,6 and Landes and 
                                                                                                                               
3. Although I am not a specialist in either ethics or legal theory, my sense of the 
chapters on ethics is similar. Moore is not attempting to develop a new moral theory, but only 
to articulate a sensible and defensible position from among the views currently on offer. On 
the other hand, some of the discussion on legal theory does seem to be breaking new ground, 
even considered in isolation from the connections with ethics and metaphysics. I have in mind 
particularly the critiques of the harm-within-the-risk approach in chapters eight through ten, of 
intervening cause doctrines in chapters eleven and twelve, notions of accomplice liability in 
chapter thirteen, and insurance contracts involving the World Trade Center in the appendix. 
But I will leave it to others more qualified than I to discuss these in detail. 
4. MOORE, supra note 1, at 95. 
5. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1–44 (1960). 
6. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
28 (1970). 
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Posner,7 who claim that the function of the law is to achieve efficiency. In 
order to achieve justice, the law must employ notions of liability that closely 
track moral responsibility. Specifically, the law must strive to punish those 
who do wrong, and to compensate those who have been wronged.8  
Moore’s normative ethical theory, developed in chapters two and three, 
is a moderate deontology.9 We have a variety of prima facie moral duties, 
both positive and negative.10 Wrongdoing requires both an actus reus and a 
mens rea. I will put discussions of mens rea aside, and focus on actus reus. 
Moore argues that a principle basis for actus reus is the causation of harm to 
others.11 This is not the only basis, however; we will discuss another such 
basis below. Moore allows some scope for justifying the violation of a prima 
facie duty by appeal to salutary consequences.12 But such justification is 
especially limited in the case of causing harm to others. To use a standard 
illustration, it would not be morally permissible to kill an innocent person in 
order to harvest his organs, even if doing so will save three others in 
desperate need of transplants. 
Since morality is central to law, and causation (especially causation of 
harm) is central to morality, causation must be central to the law. This is 
sometimes obscured by the fact that legal doctrines are cast in terms of 
causative verbs like ‘kill,’ rather than explicitly causal language like ‘cause 
to die.’ But such causative verbs are to be cashed out in terms of causation.13 
Moreover, the notion of causation that figures in the law is the natural one 
that we find in the world, not some kind of legal construct. 14  
Moore examines a number of the proximate cause doctrines that have 
been proposed in the law, and finds many of them wanting.15 In particular, 
any doctrine that appeals to the intentions of agents, or the purpose of legal 
statutes, will not pass metaphysical muster. Consider, for example, standard 
intervening cause doctrines.16 Suppose Defendant negligently spills 
                                                                                                                               
7. William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic 
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109–34 (1983). 
8. MOORE, supra note 1, at 92–96. 
9. Id. at 20–80. 
10. Id. at 38–40. 
11. Id. at 81. 
12. Id. at 40–41. 
13. Id. at 3–19. 
14. Id. at 95.  
15. Id. at 109–36, 254–79. 
16. See HERBERT L.A. HART & A. M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985) for 
further elaboration on intervening cause doctrines.  
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gasoline.17 Bystander throws a lit cigarette into the gasoline, causing a fire.18 
According to standard intervening cause doctrines, if Bystander maliciously 
threw the cigarette into the gasoline, intending to cause a fire, his action 
constitutes an intervening cause, and the spilt gasoline is not considered a 
cause of the fire. However, if Bystander threw his cigarette innocently, for 
instance if he had no knowledge of the spilt gasoline, then his action is not an 
intervening cause, and the spilt gasoline is considered a cause of the fire. 
This is true, according to intervening cause doctrines, even though 
Bystander’s bodily motions might be exactly the same in the two cases. 
Moore derides this way of thinking as a belief in ‘telekinesis’19: it would 
imply that Bystander, by means of his will alone, can affect whether 
Defendant’s action causes the fire. 
Moore then canvasses a variety of accounts of causation drawn from 
both the philosophical and legal literatures. He tentatively advocates a 
singularist theory of causation,20 although he leaves the details of such a 
theory unspecified. He defends two potentially controversial claims about 
causation. The first is that causation is a scalar quantity: it is not all-or-
nothing, but can come in degrees.21 In particular, causation can attenuate 
over the course of causal chains.22 Although it is common in the 
psychological literature to assess subjects’ judgments about the strength of 
causal relationships, the idea that causation might come in degrees as a 
matter of basic metaphysics is novel and interesting. It would be interesting 
to explore further the kinds of factors that influence degree of causation. The 
second controversial claim is that cases of omission, prevention, and ‘double 
prevention’23 are not cases of genuine causation.24 For example, suppose 
Defendant sees Victim struggling in the water. Suppose that Defendant either 
(i) is a strong swimmer and could easily save Victim with no risk to herself, 
but does not do so; or (ii) cannot save Victim herself, but ties up a lifeguard 
who otherwise would have saved Victim. Then, according to Moore, 
                                                                                                                               
17. Since my discussion will involve numerous hypotheticals, it will be helpful to have 
a recurring cast of characters. Principal among these will be Defendant and Victim. It goes 
without saying that Defendant is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In order to 
distribute both harm and blame equally, I will change the genders of the actors at random. 
18. This example is based on the facts of Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & Ry. Co., 126 
S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910). 
19. MOORE, supra note 1, at 137. 
20. Id. at 496–512. 
21. Id. at 71–73, 356–61. 
22. Id. at 359. 
23. Id. at 426. 
24. Id. at 426–70. 
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Defendant did not cause Victim’s death, although she might nonetheless be 
morally responsible and legally liable for Victim’s death on some non-causal 
basis.25 
Along the way, Moore presents a detailed critique of the counterfactual 
theory of causation, as enshrined in the ‘but for’ or ‘sine qua non’ test in the 
law, and developed in detail by the philosopher David Lewis26 and followers. 
As a first pass, such a theory will say that C is a cause of E just in case the 
following counterfactual is true: if C had not occurred, then E would not 
have occurred.27 It will be helpful to briefly review Moore’s main criticisms 
of this theory.  
First, there are problems with the counterfactuals themselves.28 In order 
for the counterfactual theory to have any hope of success, counterfactuals 
must not ‘backtrack’29 from effects to causes. For instance, after Defendant 
shoots Victim dead, we must not reason: ‘if Victim hadn’t died, then 
Defendant would not have shot him.’ For if we do, the ‘but for’ test will tell 
us that Victim’s death caused Defendant’s shot, rather than (or in addition to) 
vice versa. Moore raises specific criticisms of Lewis’s apparatus for 
generating the directionality of counterfactual dependence. But he also raises 
the question of whether the needed ‘non-backtracking’ counterfactuals are 
really the counterfactuals of ordinary language, rather than some kind of ad 
hoc construct. If not, causation is not really being analyzed in terms of 
counterfactuals, but rather in terms of whatever tools are used in the 
construction. 
Second, counterfactual theories have well-known problems with cases of 
preemption and overdetermination.30 Suppose, for example, that Defendant 
shoots Victim through the heart. Accomplice either (i) simultaneously shoots 
Victim through the heart; or (ii) shoots Victim a moment later, her bullet 
piercing Victim’s heart after he has already died; or (iii) stands at the ready, 
determined to shoot if Defendant does not kill Victim. In all of these cases, 
                                                                                                                               
25. Id. at 62–63. 
26. See, e.g., David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556–67 (1973), reprinted with 
postscripts in DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOLUME II 159–213 (Oxford Univ. Press 
ed. 1986) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS], and Causation as Influence, 97 J. PHIL. 182 
(2000). For an expanded version see CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS 75–106 (John 
Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul eds., 2004) [hereinafter CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS]. 
27. It is standard to require, in addition, that C and E be events that actually occurred, 
and that they be distinct from one another. MOORE, supra note 1, at 401. 
28. Id. at 371–90, 400–09. 
29. This term is from David Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow, 13 
NOÛS 455 (1979), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 32–33. 
30. MOORE, supra note 1, at 410–25. 
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Defendant’s shot is a cause of Victim’s death, but it’s false that if Defendant 
had not shot, Victim would not have died. Defenders of counterfactual 
theories have made numerous attempts to solve these problems, but Moore 
finds them wanting. 
Third, counterfactual theories are overly promiscuous in what they count 
as causes.31 In particular, a counterfactual theory would count omissions, 
preventions, and double-preventions as causes, when they are not.  
I will discuss the third objection at some length in section five below, but 
wish to make a couple of brief remarks about the first two. With respect to 
the second objection, for the benefit of any causation geeks who might be 
reading, I point out that Moore does not discuss some of the most recent, and 
to my mind most promising, attempts to deal with cases of preemption and 
overdetermination. I have in mind particularly approaches based on causal 
modeling methods that have been developed by Ned Hall,32 Joseph Halpern 
and Judea Pearl,33 and myself,34 as well as similar proposals (but not 
formulated in a causal modeling framework) by Stephen Yablo.35 But Moore 
is certainly correct that preemption and overdetermination do pose serious 
problems for a counterfactual theory of causation. Moore also raises a 
blanket challenge to any such attempt to develop a more sophisticated 
counterfactual theory to handle cases of preemption and overdetermination.36 
Moore claims that even if these approaches are successful, something will 
have been lost. Causation still cannot be identified with counterfactual 
dependence.37 I think that this deceptively simple complaint points to a 
genuine problem. I would bring this problem out in a slightly different way. 
If the simple version of a counterfactual theory of causation were correct, the 
theory would explain why causation is a natural, distinctive, and important 
relation. Suppose, however, that causation turns out to be extensionally 
equivalent to counterfactual dependence with bells and whistles added 
                                                                                                                               
31. Id. at 394–400. 
32. See generally N. Hall, Structural Equations and Causation, 132 PHIL. STUD. 109 
(2007). 
33. See generally Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl, Causes and Explanations: A 
Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes, 56 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 843 (2005). 
34. Christopher Hitchcock, The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and 
Graphs, 98 J. PHIL. 273, 274 (2001); Christopher Hitchcock, Prevention, Preemption, and the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, 116 PHIL. REV. 495, 496–97 (2007). 
35. Stephen Yablo, De Facto Dependence, 99 J. PHIL. 130 (2002); Stephen Yablo, 
Advertisement for a Sketch of an Outline of a Prototheory of Causation, in CAUSATION AND 
COUNTERFACTUALS, supra note 26, at 421–22.  
36. MOORE, supra note 1, at 421–22. 
37. Id. at 396. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011] THE METAPHYSICAL BASES OF LIABILITY 383 
 
 
(where these bells and whistles might themselves be definable in terms of 
counterfactuals). Pointing to this equivalence does not go very far toward 
explaining why causation is such an interesting or an important relation. 
Consider some other relation, schmausation, which can be defined in terms 
of counterfactual dependence, adding drums and trumpets instead of bells 
and whistles. From the perspective of the counterfactual theory, 
schmausation is no less natural or distinctive. So why has schmausation 
failed to attract the attention of metaphysicians, ethicists, and legal theorists?  
With respect to Moore’s first criticism of counterfactual theories, I offer 
an ad hominem response: Moore himself is committed to there being non-
backtracking counterfactuals of exactly the sort required by a counterfactual 
theory of causation. This is because Moore claims that liability for 
omissions, preventions, and double-preventions, when it exists, is based upon 
counterfactual dependence.38 For example, in the drowning scenarios 
described above, Defendant may be liable for Victim’s death on the grounds 
that Victim would not have died if Defendant had saved her, or if Victim had 
not tied up the lifeguard. But if we couple this idea with backtracking 
counterfactuals, we will get absurd results. Suppose, for example, that 
Victim and Defendant are together when Victim is injured. Defendant takes 
Victim to the emergency room and remains with him. As a result, Defendant 
misses a scheduled meeting. Victim then sues Defendant for negligence in 
failing to attend the meeting. Victim’s attorney reasons that since Defendant 
would never abandon an injured person just to attend a meeting, the 
following counterfactual must be true: if Defendant had attended the 
meeting, then Victim would not have been injured. Thus, Victim’s attorney 
argues, Defendant is liable for Victim’s injury, on the grounds that the injury 
was counterfactually dependent on Defendant’s failure to attend the meeting. 
Clearly, if Moore is to ground liability for omissions, preventions, and 
double-preventions in counterfactual dependence, he will have to rule out 
these kinds of backtracking counterfactuals. 
III.  MY METAPHYSICS 
I will now offer a quick sketch of my own metaphysical picture, 
developed and defended at length in a series of articles.39 The basic notion is 
                                                                                                                               
38. Id. at 426–70. 
39. See generally Christopher Hitchcock, A Tale of Two Effects, 110 PHIL. REV. 361 
(2001); Christopher Hitchcock, Of Humean Bondage, 54 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 1 (2003); 
Christopher Hitchcock, What Russell Got Right, in CAUSATION, PHYSICS, AND THE 
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that of a causal relationship between variables. ‘Variable,’ here, is intended 
in the sense of a random variable from measure theory. Intuitively, a 
variable has ‘values’ that correspond to members of a set of incompatible 
possibilities. For instance, a variable may range over the possibilities 
‘raining’ and ‘not raining’, representing the state of the weather at a 
particular time and place. Variables can be more or less coarse grained; for 
instance, we could have a variable with values ‘heavy rain,’ ‘light rain,’ 
‘overcast,’ and ‘sunny;’ we could even have a variable with quantitative 
values corresponding to the rate of rainfall.  
What it means for a relationship to be causal can best be approached 
indirectly by considering what makes a relationship non-causal. A 
relationship is non-causal if it is accidental or spurious.40 Suppose, for 
example, that Defendant regularly walks to work along a route that takes her 
past Victim’s house. Victim notices that on days when Defendant has her 
umbrella up, his basement tends to flood. On a particular Monday, Defendant 
walks past Victim’s house with her umbrella up, and Defendant’s basement 
floods shortly after that. The flooding occurs right after Defendant’s action, 
and in close proximity to it. Moreover, there is a correlation between 
flooding and Defendant’s walking with an open umbrella. But this is not a 
causal relationship. What is happening, of course, is that Defendant tends to 
have her umbrella open on days when it is raining heavily, and those are the 
days when Victim’s basement is most likely to flood.  
The notion of a causal relationship is closely related to Lewis’s notion of 
a non-backtracking counterfactual involving propositions about distinct 
events.41 In our example, we might reason as follows: Defendant is a 
reasonable person, and she does not like to get drenched, so if she had not 
been carrying an umbrella on that particular day, it would surely have been 
because it was not raining. This is a backtracking counterfactual. From the 
contrary-to-fact supposition that Defendant did not have her umbrella open, 
we reason backward to the absence of causes or conditions that would lead 
her to have her umbrella open. As we have already seen, a counterfactual 
theory of causation is a non-starter if counterfactuals are allowed to 
backtrack. Lewis posited that counterfactuals do not backtrack, and 
developed an elaborate apparatus to account for why they do not.42 
                                                                                                                               
CONSTITUTION OF REALITY 45 (Huw Price & Richard Corry eds., 2007); Christopher 
Hitchcock, Three Concepts of Causation, 2 PHIL. COMPASS 508 (2007). 
40. Moore notes that the law is committed to excluding both of these from the notion of 
causation. MOORE, supra note 1, at 111–13. 
41. PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 164–167, 170–171. 
42. Lewis, supra note 29, at 34–37. 
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My own approach differs from Lewis’s in three important respects. First, 
I harbor no reductive aspirations. While Lewis tried to account for the truth 
values of non-backtracking counterfactuals in non-causal terms, I do not 
strongly believe that this can or need be done. Second, I do not claim that 
non-backtracking counterfactuals are the standard or natural interpretations 
of ordinary language counterfactuals. I am satisfied if there is some class of 
counterfactuals that can be given a non-backtracking interpretation. In 
particular, I think that if I specify to my audience that my counterfactuals are 
non-backtrackers, I can make them understand me, and they will agree with 
me about the truth values of these counterfactuals so long as we agree on all 
of the underlying facts. Third, and most subtly, I think that once we have 
something like Lewis’s non-backtracking counterfactuals, we are already 
within the realm of the causal. Lewis did not identify causation with 
counterfactual dependence (for reasons having to do with preemption); he 
thought that even once you had non-backtracking counterfactuals, there was 
still some work to be done to define the relation of causation.43 But there is a 
tension in Lewis here. In “Causation,” Lewis uses the term ‘causal 
dependence’ to denote non-backtracking counterfactual dependence among 
propositions about the occurrence or non-occurrence of events.44 In a later 
paper,45 he calls such non-backtracking counterfactuals ‘causal 
counterfactuals.’46 If ‘causal’ here is meant to be descriptive, and not merely 
a piece of technical jargon, then Lewis seems to be agreeing that we have 
already entered the realm of the causal once we have non-backtracking 
counterfactual dependence.47 
Whatever one’s views on the ultimate metaphysics of causal 
relationships, I think that defenders of manipulationist or interventionist 
theories of causation have far and away the best account of what is special 
and interesting about causal relationships. The idea behind interventionist 
accounts seems to go back at least to Galileo.48 The view was resuscitated in 
                                                                                                                               
43. PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 167, 171–172 
44. Id. at 165–67. 
45. David Lewis, Causal Decision Theory, 59 AUSTL. J.  PHIL. 5, 21–28 (1981), 
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 305–37.  
46. PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 326.  
47. As Carolina Sartorio pointed out to me, Lewis does consider counterfactual 
dependence to be sufficient for causation, so it is possible that he intends the adjective ‘causal’ 
to indicate that this counterfactual dependence indicates a particular type of causation. I think 
it is especially hard to square this explanation for his usage with Causal Decision Theory, 
supra note 45, where Lewis does not even appeal to his own account of causation. 
48. See Steffen Ducheyne, Galileo's Interventionist Notion of “Cause,” 67 J. HIST. 
IDEAS 443, 459–64 (2006). 
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twentieth century analytic philosophy by Douglas Gasking,49 and given a 
recent and detailed elaboration by James Woodward.50 The idea is that causal 
relationships, unlike accidental or spurious relationships, remain stable under 
interventions on the (putative) causal variable.51 Consider again our story of 
the umbrella and the flooded basement. As we saw, the correlation exists 
only because of the particular way in which Defendant’s umbrella-carrying 
behavior is brought about: she chooses to carry her umbrella on days when it 
is raining. Suppose, however, some kind of intervention takes place to 
prevent her from carrying her umbrella in the usual manner. Perhaps Victim 
asks her nicely not to use it, and buys her a top-of-the-line raincoat to use 
instead. Perhaps Victim steals her umbrella. Or, to make the relevance to 
legal issues clear, suppose that Victim threatens Defendant with a lawsuit. 
We might even imagine that Defendant’s umbrella magically vanishes, in 
what Lewis calls a ‘small miracle.’52 If Defendant’s umbrella-carrying 
behavior were to be altered in any of these ways, the correlation between her 
walking with an open umbrella and Victim’s flooded basement would cease 
to exist. Victim, by intervening on Defendant’s behavior, makes no 
difference to whether his basement gets flooded. The key idea, then, is that 
causal relationships, unlike accidental or spurious relationships, can be 
exploited to produce desirable outcomes.  
Note that even many of those whom Moore labels ‘causal skeptics’ are 
committed to this basic distinction between causal and non-causal 
relationships. For example, consider economically-oriented theorists such as 
Coase, Calabresi, or Landes and Posner,53 who reject all notions of proximate 
causation in favor of a conception of the law according to which its goal is to 
promote efficiency. Since the law provides a series of incentives and 
disincentives to perform various actions, it is attempting to intervene on the 
actions of agents. These interventions will only be successful in promoting 
efficient outcomes if they target behaviors that are causally related to the 
outcomes in question. Suppose, for example, that the cost to Defendant of 
getting wet is less than the cost to Victim of a flooded basement. 
Nonetheless, providing a disincentive for Defendant to carry her umbrella, in 
the form of a right of Victim to sue for the cost of a flooded basement, will 
                                                                                                                               
49. See generally Douglas Gasking, Causation and Recipes, 64 MIND 479 (1955).  
50. See generally JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION (2003). 
51. Id. at 25–38, 45–61, 65–70, 239–65. 
52 . Lewis, supra note 29, at 47–48. Lewis also uses the adjectives ‘little’ and ‘tiny’ to 
describe these miracles. Id. at 44–45.  
53. See supra notes 5–7.  
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do nothing to promote efficiency. All that will happen is that Defendant will 
get wet and Victim’s basement will still get flooded. A similar remark 
applies to the probabilities that appear in the well-known Hand formula, 
described by Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in United States v. Carroll 
Towing,54 for determining whether a risk is sufficiently great to constitute 
negligence. If these are just ordinary conditional probabilities, the formula 
will rule as negligent behaviors that are merely correlated with serious 
harms. In order for the formula to have any plausibility, the probabilities 
figuring in it must be the sorts of counterfactual probabilities employed by 
Lewis in the probabilistic version of his counterfactual theory,55 or else the 
complex conditional probabilities employed in probabilistic theories of 
causation.56  
Given the basic notion of a causal relationship, it is possible to define a 
number of different kinds of more specific relations. A simple example will 
help to illustrate. Suppose I press the power button on my stereo, I set the 
volume to four, the treble to five, and the bass to six. I put a copy of John 
Coltrane’s Giant Steps in the CD player, and music comes out of the 
speakers. Consider the way in which the sound emanating from the speakers 
depends upon all of these factors. First, the power button can only be used to 
turn the music on or off. It has a kind of all-or-nothing effect on the sound. 
Let us call this kind of relationship ‘on-off dependence.’ The volume knob 
can be used to exercise a more fine-grained control over the sound. By 
turning the knob a little bit, I can make the sound a little bit louder, or a little 
bit softer. The volume knob can also be used to turn the sound off entirely, 
by setting the volume to zero. Following Lewis,57 let us call this kind of 
relationship ‘influence.’ The bass and treble knobs also exert a kind of fine-
grained control over the music. By turning them a small amount, I can subtly 
alter the balance of high and low pitches. However, unlike the volume knob, 
neither the bass nor the treble knob can be used to turn off the music 
completely. Let us call this kind of relationship ‘fine-tuning.’ I can also 
exercise control over the sound coming out of the speakers through my 
                                                                                                                               
54. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
55. Lewis, Postscripts to “Causation,” in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26, at 
175–84. 
56. See Nancy Cartwright, Causal Laws and Effective Strategies, 13 NOÛS 419, 429–33, 
435–36 (1979); Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic Causation, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (WINTER 2011 EDITION) (EDWARD N. ZALTA ED., 2010), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/; ELLERY EELLS, 
PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY (1991). 
57. Lewis, Causation as Influence, supra note 26, at 190–91. 
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choice of which CD to play. Instead of Giant Steps, I could listen to Johnny 
Clegg’s Cruel, Crazy, Beautiful World, or Dvořak’s Piano Quintet in A 
Major. Indeed, through choice of CD, I can produce a much greater variety 
of sounds than I could using just the volume, bass, or treble knobs. However, 
I cannot in this way produce very small changes in the music. I cannot 
produce a slightly different version of Giant Steps,58 say one with a slightly 
slower tempo, one transposed up by a tone, or one with an alternative chord 
progression. Nor can I produce a sound that is somewhere between Coltrane 
and Dvořak, say by eliminating the upright bass and adding a viola and cello. 
Let us call this kind of relationship ‘discrete influence.’ Thus, the sound that 
is coming out of the speaker depends upon the power button, the volume, 
bass and treble knobs, and the CD. This dependence is causal: the 
relationship is stable when I intervene on each of these, and I can use them to 
change the sound that comes out of the speakers. But the music depends 
upon all of these things in somewhat different ways. 
This example illustrates just one dimension along which causal 
relationships can differ. Another dimension concerns the nature of the causal 
pathways whereby one factor affects another. We can ask whether the 
influence is relatively direct, or whether there are salient intermediate 
variables. In several publications59 I have argued for the importance of the 
ways in which causal relationships are broken down into separate pathways, 
as well as for the importance of a notion of path-specific causal 
dependence.60 But let’s put these more complex types of causal relationship 
aside for now and return to the simple example of my stereo. 
According to the theory developed in Lewis’s “Causation”61 the position 
of the power button would count as a cause of the music coming out of the 
speakers, while the position of the treble knob would not.62 This is because 
Lewis’s original counterfactual theory was based on counterfactuals in which 
                                                                                                                               
58. Unless you count the alternate take that is included as a bonus feature on the CD. 
59. Hitchcock, A Tale of Two Effects, supra note 39, at 362–63; Christopher Hitchcock, 
The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs, supra note 34 at 273–74; 
Christopher Hitchcock, Routes, Processes, and Chance-lowering Causes, in CAUSE AND 
CHANCE: CAUSATION IN AN INDETERMINISTIC WORLD 138–51 (Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof 
eds., 2006). 
60. See also Judea Pearl, Direct and Indirect Effects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE ON UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 411, 418–20 
(2001). 
61. Lewis, Causation, supra note 26. 
62. This assumes that we don’t take the event of the music coming out the speakers to 
be extremely fragile. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 412–14 (discussing the disadvantages of 
treating events as highly fragile). 
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the effect does not occur at all.63 If the power button had not been pressed, 
there would have been no music; but if the treble knob had a different 
position, there still would have been music. On the other hand, according to 
Lewis’s “Causation as Influence” theory,64 the treble knob would count as a 
cause of the sound, while the power button would not. This is because the 
treble knob exerts a fine-grained control over the exact nature of the sound, 
while the power button does not. This is a bit odd, since the later theory was 
designed to deal with specific problems involving preemption, not to 
fundamentally change what kinds of things counted as causes. 
My own, somewhat heterodox, view of these matters is that there is 
something a little bit funny about this whole enterprise. That is, once we 
learn that the music coming out of the speakers depends upon the CD, the 
power button, and the various knobs in the ways described, it is odd to think 
that there is some further question about which of these things are causes of 
the music, and which are not. There are various different kinds of causal 
relationship, and any one might be relevant for some specific purpose. For 
example, if my wife complains about the noise, I can use the power button or 
the volume knob to assuage her; changing CDs or adjusting the treble won’t 
help. On the other hand, if I want to impress a guest with the sound quality of 
my stereo, adjusting the sound with the bass or treble knob might just do the 
trick, while turning off the power will not. 
By way of analogy, consider the economic concept of inflation. Inflation 
has to do with changes in the prices of goods. Suppose that during a 
particular time period the price of pork rises by one dollar a pound, while the 
price of beef drops by fifty cents a pound. This change will have very 
different effects upon Hindus, Muslims, and vegetarians. More subtly, it will 
have different effects upon those who strongly prefer pork or beef, those who 
prefer to keep a variety of meats in their diet, and those who are perfectly 
happy to eat whatever‘s cheapest. Now it is often useful to distill a complex 
array of changes in price into a simple measure, an index of inflation. But 
any formula that is used to do this will necessarily build in explicit or 
implicit assumptions about the values of consumers. There is no one 
objectively correct measure of overall rate of inflation. This does not mean 
that inflation is purely subjective, that it is just an artificial construct of 
economists, or anything like that. The changes in the prices of goods are real 
enough, and they can have dramatic effects that cannot be ‘constructed’ 
away. Rather, inflation is complex and multi-faceted, and which facet one 
                                                                                                                               
63. PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 26 at 165–67. 
64. Lewis, Causation as Influence, supra note 26. 
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should focus on depends upon the particular problem that one is trying to 
address. 
I think something similar is true of causation. I think that the analogy 
with inflation is particularly apt for Moore’s conception of causation as a 
scalar quantity.65 Consider again the various factors that affect the sound that 
comes out of my stereo. How should we quantify the degree of influence that 
each knob exerts on the sound? If my volume knob is like the one in the 
movie This is Spinal Tap, which goes up to eleven, would that make the 
volume setting ten percent more of a cause than an ordinary volume knob 
that only goes up to ten? And how are we to weight the importance of fine-
grained control (the bass and treble knobs) as opposed to ability to turn the 
sound off entirely (the power button)? It seems very implausible to me that 
there are objectively correct answers to these questions as a matter of basic 
metaphysics. 
IV.  CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PRUDENTIAL RATIONALITY 
I have suggested that what kind of causal relationship one focuses on 
will depend upon the kind of question that one is asking. In this section, I 
want to illustrate this point with one particular example. Consider the 
concept of prudential rationality. I have in mind here the sort of concept that 
it is the target of various versions of decision theory.66 An agent values 
different possible outcomes to various degrees. Given her values, which 
course of action should she pursue? In addressing this kind of question, the 
causal concept that is needed is just the basic notion of causal dependence, 
i.e., non-backtracking counterfactual dependence.  
Suppose that Winesnob has a bottle of Pommard. While she likes 
Pommard, she would prefer a Brunello. She finds herself in a choice 
situation. There are three actions she could perform: A1, A2, and A3. If she 
were to perform A1, the status quo would be maintained. If she were to 
perform either A2 or A3, the result would be that she would lose the bottle of 
Pommard, acquire a Brunello, and everything else of concern to her would 
                                                                                                                               
65. MOORE, supra note 1, at 71, 109–56. 
66. I have in mind, particularly, versions of causal decision theory such as those 
presented in Alan Gibbard & William L. Harper, Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected 
Utility, in 1 FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF DECISION THEORY: THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 125–27 (C. A. Hooker et al. eds., 1978); Lewis, Causal Decision Theory, supra 
note 45, at 21–28; and JAMES M. JOYCE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSAL DECISION THEORY 146 
(1999). But the idea is at least implicit in the tradition going back to LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 6–27 (1954). 
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remain unchanged. It seems clear that she should prefer either A2 or A3 over 
A1, but that she should have no preference between A2 and A3. The rationality 
of these preferences is settled by the outcomes of each hypothetical action; 
we don’t need to know any more of the causal details. It does not matter if in 
performing A2 her losing the Pommard is a means to acquiring the Brunello, 
while in A3 it is merely a side effect. This does not make A2 any less rational. 
It does not matter if A2 would cause the Brunello to come into her 
possession, while A3 would merely allow it to come into her possession. This 
would not make A2 more rational. And it does not matter if A2 would preempt 
some other process, which would cause the Brunello to come into her 
possession if she were to perform A3 instead. That would not make A2 any 
more rational than A3. In general, the various sorts of worries that normally 
plague attempts to analyze causation in terms of counterfactuals play 
absolutely no role in assessing the rationality of her actions. All that matters 
is how the various outcomes depend upon her hypothetical actions.67  
As further evidence in support of this point, I cite my favorite piece of 
Lewis trivia. In “Causal Decision Theory,” Lewis advocates a decision 
theory that incorporates causal considerations, and then formulates a specific 
version of causal decision theory.68 But there is a curious omission: he never 
makes use of his own theory of causation.69 This seems very strange. The 
most influential philosopher of the twentieth century to write on causation 
argues that decision theory should be based on causation, and then in 
formulating such a theory, he ignores his own account of causation! The 
reason, I think, is this. In his theory of causation, he does not identify 
causation with counterfactual dependence, but adds some bells and whistles 
in an attempt to deal with preemption. But for purposes of decision, it is just 
the non-backtracking counterfactuals that are wanted. 
                                                                                                                               
67. Note, that as a linguistic matter, the propositions that Winesnob must entertain are 
future hypotheticals, rather than counterfactuals. She reasons: “if I were to perform A2, then I 
would acquire the Brunello;” not “if I had performed A2, I would have acquired the Brunello.” 
As a sociological fact, philosophers tend to use the word ‘counterfactual’ in a broader sense 
than others, meaning roughly ‘subjunctive conditional.’ It is not essential that the antecedent 
be contrary to fact, nor that the conditional be expressed in the past tense. The future 
hypotheticals that Winesnob must consider are counterfactuals in this broad sense. What is 
important for my purposes is that the sort of dependence expressed by both past tense 
counterfactuals and future hypotheticals is essentially the same. 
68. Lewis, Causal Decision Theory, supra note 45, at 12. 
69. Id. at 21–28. Lewis does briefly cite his 1973 paper “Causation,” but only in the 
context of arguing that counterfactuals should be given a non-backtracking interpretation. Id. 
at 22. 
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This connection between what I have been calling ‘causal dependence’ 
— i.e. what Lewis variously calls ‘causal dependence,’ ‘causal 
counterfactuals,’ and ‘non-backtracking counterfactuals’ — and rational 
decision-making, suffices to show that causal dependence deserves its name. 
That is, I take it that it as more or less axiomatic that it is rational to try to act 
so as to cause desirable outcomes, and not merely to perform actions that are 
correlated with good outcomes. At least, I take this connection between 
causation and rationality to be at least as central to the notion of causation as 
any connection between causation and morality. 
However, unless one is a hardcore utilitarian,70 one thinks that the basic 
relation of causal dependence is not the one that is central to moral 
evaluation. In order to know whether act A1 is morally preferable to act A2, it 
is not enough to know what the ultimate consequences of these hypothetical 
acts would be. One also needs to know something about the details of how 
these consequences come about. It is, I think, one of the very deep problems 
of philosophy just why this should be so.  
I do not want to fault Professor Moore for omitting to solve this problem: 
it is an extraordinarily difficult one. But I think that the existence and 
importance of the problem gets obscured somewhat in his treatment of the 
connection between causation and morality. Moore uses ‘causation’ to pick 
out a much more specific and selective kind of relationship than my causal 
dependence.71 As the discussion in the previous section makes clear, I am 
skeptical that there is some objective, metaphysical relation of the sort 
Moore has in mind. But let us put those worries aside and suppose that there 
is some kind of relationship that is objective, that has more or less those 
features that Moore describes, and that accords well enough with ordinary 
uses of the verb ‘cause’ to deserve the name. Still, there would be a question 
about just why this concept plays such a central role in morality. It is not 
enough just to point to truisms such as that it is prima facie wrong to cause 
harm. It is equally a truism that it is rational to try to cause good outcomes. 
But as we have seen, the relation that figures in the latter truism is not the 
narrower relation of causation that Moore is interested in, but rather my 
broader notion of causal dependence. So there must be something specific 
about Moore’s narrower relation of causation that makes it, rather than my 
broader notion of causal dependence, central to morality in particular. It is 
not enough to say that this relation is central to morality because it is the 
causal relation. 
                                                                                                                               
70. Perhaps Shelly Kagan, Alastair Norcross, or Peter Singer would qualify. 
71. Moore, supra note 1, at 302–14, 396–400, 435–67.  
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V.  PREVENTIONS, OMISSIONS, AND DOUBLE PREVENTIONS 
I now want to bring our differences, as well as the problem raised at the 
end of the last section, into sharper focus. I will do this by considering 
Moore’s treatment of preventions, omissions, and double-preventions in 
Chapter Eighteen.72 We may illustrate these three relations using variations 
on an example given by Moore. Suppose Victim is struggling in the water, 
and will drown unless someone saves her.73 If Defendant pulls her out of the 
water, he prevents her drowning. She does not drown, but she would have if 
not for Defendant’s action. If instead Defendant sits idly by and watches her 
drown, although he could have saved her with minimum risk and 
inconvenience to himself, he omits to save her.74 He did not save her, but if 
he had, she would not have drowned. Finally, suppose that Defendant 
himself is a poor swimmer, and unable to save Victim. However, there is a 
lifeguard standing by. Defendant ties up the lifeguard, and Victim drowns. If 
Defendant had not tied up the lifeguard, she would have saved Victim from 
drowning.75 Defendant’s action is a double preventer of Victim’s drowning: 
he prevented an event that would have prevented her from drowning.76 What 
these relations have in common is that they all involve the absences of 
certain events. In the case of prevention, the absence of drowning is a result 
of Defendant’s action. In the case of omission, it is Defendant’s action that is 
absent. In the case of double prevention, the missing event, the lifeguard’s 
saving Victim, is an intermediary between Defendant’s act and the ultimate 
outcome. In addition to these three relations, Moore defines a fourth, (non-
omissive) allowing. Since allowing is a special case of double prevention, I 
will not discuss it separately.  
It will be helpful to have some non-question-begging terminology for 
those causal relationships that do not involve absences, such as when 
Defendant hits Victim over the head with a baseball bat. So let us call this a 
case of simple causation.77 
                                                                                                                               
72. See id. at 178–97. 
73. See id. at 62. 
74. See id. at 62–63. 
75. See id. 
76. The term ‘double prevention’ was coined by Ned Hall. See Ned Hall, Causation and 
the Price of Transitivity, 97 J. PHIL. 198, 201-02 (2000); Ned Hall, Two Concepts of 
Causation, in CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, supra note 26, at 225, 241. However, the 
term is slightly misleading, there are not two preventions, but rather the single prevention of a 
potential preventer. ‘Prevention–prevention’ might have been more apt. 
77. Moore, in effect, believes that all causation is simple causation, but it is helpful to 
have terminology that does not presuppose this. 
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Moore defends four inter-related theses about prevention, omission, and 
double prevention: 
1. They are not types of causation. 
2. There is a moral difference between these relations and simple 
causation. 
3. Preventers, omissions, and double preventers do not enter into relations 
of preemption or overdetermination. 
4. In cases of prevention, omission, and double prevention, the basis for 
moral and legal liability for the outcome (if any) is counterfactual 
dependence. 
Let us look at these claims more closely. 
Moore argues that cases of prevention, omission, and double prevention 
are not cases of causation precisely because they involve absences.78 The 
absence of an event is literally nothing; it is not the sort of thing that can 
cause or be caused. For instance, in our example of omission, Defendant’s 
failure to rescue Victim cannot be a cause of anything, since there is nothing 
there to do any causing. In cases of prevention and double prevention, 
something may be caused. In the case where Defendant rescues Victim, 
Defendant’s action causes Victim’s body to be moved to the beach; in the 
case where Defendant ties up the lifeguard, Defendant’s action causes the 
lifeguard to be tied up. However, Moore claims that in the case of 
prevention, Defendant’s action does not cause the absence of Victim’s 
drowning. Only genuine events can be effects. In the case of double 
prevention, Defendant’s tying up the lifeguard does not cause Victim’s 
death; that is caused by the rip current, the water entering her lungs, and so 
on. 
According to Moore, there is a moral difference between simply causing 
some harm, and omitting to prevent that harm, preventing something that 
would have prevented that harm, or preventing the receipt of some benefit.79 
Typically, it is worse to simply cause some harm than it is to bear one of 
these other relations to that same harm (or to an equivalent benefit, in the 
                                                                                                                               
78. MOORE, supra note 1, at 444–51, 453–59, 460–67. 
79. Id. at 426–60. 
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case of prevention).80 For example, while we might well judge that 
Defendant violated a moral duty in failing to rescue Victim, or in tying up 
the lifeguard, we would not judge Defendant as harshly as we would if 
Defendant had simply killed Victim, say by hitting her on the head with a 
baseball bat. This moral difference rests squarely on the previously discussed 
causal difference. Typically, culpably causing some harm is the most serious 
type of moral transgression.81 
This moral difference is reflected in the relative ease with which 
preventions, omissions, and double preventions can be justified on 
consequentialist grounds.82 For instance, it would be morally wrong for 
Defendant to kill Victim by hitting her over the head with a baseball bat, 
even if he uses her organs to save others who would otherwise die. We do 
not accept such a consequentialist justification for such a flagrant violation of 
one’s moral duties. On the other hand, it might be permissible to fail to save 
one person, if one can thereby save three others. Suppose, for instance, that 
Victim is drowning at the north end of the beach, three others are drowning 
at the south end, and there is only one lifeguard. The lifeguard can’t reach 
both groups on time, so she elects to rescue the three. In this case, we think 
that the lifeguard was morally justified in failing to rescue Victim. 
Preemption and overdetermination are relations that exist among causes 
and potential causes.83 Since preventers, omissions, and double preventers 
are not causes, they cannot be overdetermining causes or preempting 
causes.84 Consider McLaughlin’s famous example.85 A traveler is about to 
cross the desert with several barrels of water. One enemy empties the water 
from the barrels. A second enemy, ignorant of the actions of the first, steals 
the barrels. The traveler dies of thirst in the desert. If either enemy had acted 
alone, this would have been a case of double prevention. In the original case, 
however, neither enemy prevented the traveler from having water. The 
traveler would have been without water in any event, due to the action of the 
other enemy. According to Moore, neither act preempts the other, nor do the 
acts stand in a relation of overdetermination.86 The acts do not bear any 
                                                                                                                               
80. Id. at 447–49, 453, 460. 
81. See, e.g., id. at 95. 
82. Id. at 448. 
83. Id. at 410–21. 
84. Id. at 449–52, 457–59, 466–67. 
85. James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 155 n.25 
(1925). 
86. MOORE, supra note 1, at 466. 
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causal relationship to the traveler’s death, so the question of which 
preempted which is moot.  
Finally, Moore claims that agents can be morally responsible and legally 
liable for outcomes in cases of prevention, omission, and double prevention. 
Of course, this requires culpability, or mens rea, but let’s put this aside. In 
these cases, the basis for actus reus is not causation of harm. Rather, the 
basis lies in the counterfactual dependence of the harm on the agent’s action 
or inaction.87 In the case where Defendant fails to rescue Victim, we might 
hold Defendant accountable for Victim’s death on the grounds that Victim 
would not have died if Defendant had rescued her. In the case where 
Defendant ties up the lifeguard, we might hold him accountable for Victim’s 
death on the grounds that she would not have died if Defendant had not acted 
as he did. Where there is no counterfactual dependence, there can be no 
liability for the outcome, although there can still be a form of inchoate 
liability, analogous to liability for attempting to cause harm.88 Thus, for 
example, in McLaughlin’s example, neither enemy can be held morally 
responsible or legally liable for the traveler’s death. Each enemy could, 
however, have an inchoate liability.89 
I wish to reconsider Moore’s four theses in light of my own metaphysical 
picture, as outlined in the previous two sections. First, as a purely 
sociological observation, philosophers have defended just about every 
position imaginable with respect to preventions, omissions, and double-
preventions. Helen Beebee sides squarely with Moore in claiming that these 
are not cases of causation.90 Phil Dowe also comes close to Moore’s view, 
arguing that preventers, omissions, and double preventers are not literally 
causes, but only ‘cause’ or ‘quasi-cause’ the outcomes in question.91 Hall 
claims that there are two distinct causal relations: production and 
dependence.92 While preventers, omissions, and double preventers do not 
produce effects, effects do depend upon them. Thus, Hall thinks that 
preventers, omissions, and double preventers have a kind of secondary causal 
                                                                                                                               
87. Id. at 436, 451–53, 459–60. 
88. Id. at 467. 
89. Note, however, that if Moore is right, this would not be liability for attempted 
homicide. For even if one of them had been successful, she would not have literally killed the 
traveler. 
90. Helen Beebee, Causing and Nothingness, in CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, 
supra note 26, at 291. 
91. PHIL DOWE, PHYSICAL CAUSATION 123, 129 (2000); Phil Dowe, A Counterfactual 
Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ By Omission, 79 AUSTL. J. PHIL. 216, 217 (2001). 
92. See Ned Hall, Two Concepts of Causation, in CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, 
supra note 26, at 225. 
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status.93 Lewis94 and Jonathan Schaffer95 argue that preventers, omissions, 
and double preventers are full-blooded causes. And Sarah McGrath claims 
that omissions are sometimes causes, depending upon their normative status; 
she concludes that causation is thus partly a normative notion.96 The 
experiments of Clare Walsh and Steven Sloman97 show that ordinary subjects 
are also divided about the status of double preventers. 
To my ear, this has all the symptoms of a purely verbal dispute. Moore 
and Beebee, on the one hand, and Lewis and Schaffer, on the other, do not 
disagree about what is actually going on in any of these cases. They do not 
disagree about what events occur, about what counterfactually depends upon 
what, or about what mechanisms are operative. The disagreement is only 
about whether to classify cases of prevention, omission, and double 
prevention together with cases of simple causation under one heading: 
‘causation.’ 
What all parties should agree upon is that cases of prevention, omission, 
and double prevention are like cases of simple causation in some respects, 
but not in others. One respect in which they are similar is that in paradigm 
cases of each, there is non-backtracking counterfactual dependence. When 
Defendant hits Victim in the head with a bat, and when Victim ties up the 
lifeguard, Victim’s death counterfactually depends upon Defendant’s act: 
Victim would not have died if Defendant had acted differently. I have 
already argued that the sort of counterfactual dependence that is present in 
cases of prevention, omission, and double prevention, and which Moore 
takes as the basis for liability in such cases, is the same kind of non-
backtracking counterfactual dependence that Lewis needs for his 
counterfactual theory of causation. This counterfactual dependence means 
that preventers, omissions, and double preventers can all be means for 
pursuing one’s desired ends. From the point of view of prudential rationality, 
                                                                                                                               
93. Id. at 241–42, 248–49, 252–57. 
94. See Lewis, Causation as Influence, supra note 26, at 187, 194, 196; David Lewis, 
Void and Object, in CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, supra note 26, at 284–85. 
95. See Jonathan Schaffer, Causation by Disconnection, 67 PHIL. SCI. 285, 294–96 
(2000); Jonathan Schaffer, Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects, in 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 197, 197 (Christopher Hitchcock ed., 
2004). 
96. See generally Sarah McGrath, Causation by Omission: A Dilemma, 123 PHIL. STUD. 
125 (2005). 
97. See generally Clare R. Walsh & Steven A. Sloman, The Meaning of Cause and 
Prevent: The Role of Causal Mechanism, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 2331 (2005). 
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it makes no difference whether one achieves one’s goal by causing it, or by 
allowing it to happen.  
Moore claims that there is nonetheless a difference on this point. 
Counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation, because there can 
be cases of causal overdetermination or preemption. By contrast, 
counterfactual dependence is necessary for prevention, omission, or double 
prevention. Preventers, omissions, and double preventers do not participate 
in relations of overdetermination or preemption. We will return to this issue 
shortly, when we discuss Moore’s third claim. 
One prominent difference between cases of simple causation, and cases 
of prevention, omission, and double prevention, is that in the former cases 
there is always some causal process that that transmits energy and 
momentum between the cause and the effect. For example, when Defendant 
strikes Victim’s head with a bat, energy and momentum are transferred 
through Defendant’s arms to the bat, and onto Victim’s head. By contrast, 
when Defendant ties up the lifeguard, there is no process initiated by 
Defendant’s action that carries energy and momentum from Defendant to 
Victim.98 Dowe, especially, takes this difference to be crucial. 99 
A second difference is that typically, in cases of simple causation, the 
fine-grained details of the effect depend upon the fine-grained details of the 
cause. For example, when Defendant strikes Victim in the head, the exact 
extent of Victim’s injuries, the location of the injuries on her head, and the 
time of her death, all depend upon the precise way in which Victim strikes 
her – the placement of the bat, the velocity and timing of the swing, and so 
on. By contrast, when Defendant ties up the lifeguard, the details of Victim’s 
drowning – precisely where she drowns, when she dies, how much water fills 
her lungs, etc. – do not depend upon the details of how Defendant ties up the 
lifeguard – how thick the rope is, what kind of knot is used, exactly where 
she is tied up, etc.  
A third difference is that cases of prevention, omission, and double 
prevention, by their very nature, require that there be some other substantial 
causal factor at work. In all of our examples, there would be no prevention, 
omission, or double prevention if Victim weren’t in the water drowning. 
When Victim dies (in the cases of omission and double prevention) the 
water, the rip current, etc., must surely be included among the causes of 
death. But this need not be the case in cases of simple causation. When 
Defendant hits Victim with a bat, there need be no other substantial factor at 
                                                                                                                               
98. Except, perhaps, for trivial and irrelevant ones, like photons and sound waves. 
99. Dowe, PHYSICAL CAUSATION, supra note 91 at 123–45. 
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work in Victim’s death. Some cases of simple causation will also have other 
substantial factors, however. For example, if Defendant pushes Victim in 
front of a bus, the bus itself is a substantial factor in Victim’s death. 
A related point is that cases of prevention, omission and double 
prevention require certain kinds of fortuitous circumstances. It is only 
because Victim is struggling in the water that Defendant can prevent her 
from drowning, omit to save her, or prevent her from being saved. If 
Defendant is a professional hit man, he would not be able to earn much of a 
living by tying up lifeguards. It is only in a very special kind of circumstance 
that tying up a lifeguard will result in the death of one’s intended victim. By 
contrast, striking someone in the head with a bat is a more reliable way of 
bringing about their death. One’s victim must be within bat’s reach, but 
beyond that, no fortuitous circumstances are needed.100  
Now suppose we agree with Moore that these (and other) differences 
between preventers, omissions, and double preventers, on the one hand, and 
simple causes, on the other, are substantial enough that we should not group 
them all together under the heading ‘causation.’ The point I want to urge is 
that any moral difference that exists prevention, omission, and double 
prevention, on the one hand, and genuine causation on the other, must rest on 
one or more of these specific differences between them. The bare fact that 
one type of case is classified as causation, while the other is not, does not do 
any explanatory work by itself.  
As far as I can see, the first two differences don’t offer much promise for 
grounding a moral difference. The first concerns the means whereby 
Victim’s death is made dependent upon Defendant’s actions. It is hard to see 
what moral difference could rest on the use of means that involve the 
transmission of energy and momentum. If there were magical beings that 
could kill through telekinesis, this unusual mechanism would hardly absolve 
them of the strongest form of moral responsibility for abusing their power. 
The second difference might be relevant if we think that Defendant is 
especially culpable for bringing about Victim’s death in a slow and painful 
fashion. But in the example where Defendant hits Victim with a bat, the sorts 
of fine-grained differences in the way Victim could die do not seem to make 
a moral difference. Morally, it makes no difference whether Victim dies at 
seven minutes and nine seconds past noon from a contusion in the right 
parietal lobe, or at seven minutes and ten seconds past noon from a contusion 
                                                                                                                               
100.  This is related to the distinction between sensitive and insensitive causation, 
discussed by Lewis, Postscripts to “Causation,” supra note 26, at 184–88, and James 
Woodward, Sensitive and Insensitive Causation, 115 PHIL REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
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in the left occipital lobe. So it is hard to see how dependence of such fine-
grained details on Defendant’s action could be morally significant. By 
contrast, the third and fourth differences do seem morally relevant. In our 
drowning scenarios, it was Victim’s choice to go swimming in an area prone 
to dangerous rip currents, despite being a weak swimmer. Defendant played 
no role in creating the perilous conditions, nor in directing them toward 
Victim. Thus, it might be reasonable to conclude that Defendant’s 
contribution to Victim’s death was only partial. On the other hand, similar 
remarks apply if Defendant pushes Victim in front of a bus, and I doubt that 
anyone would think that the substantial causal contribution of the bus in any 
way diminishes Defendant’s moral responsibility. I will leave it to others to 
try to spell out the details of such an account. My present point is that this is 
the sort of story that would be necessary to explain a moral distinction 
between simple causation, and omission, prevention, and double prevention. 
There is another important moral difference specifically in the case of 
omissions. Duties not to omit are positive duties: they are duties to perform 
certain actions. The logic of such positive duties is different from the logic of 
negative duties. Consider, for example, the positive duty to offer aid to those 
in need, and contrast it with the negative duty to refrain from killing. A 
negative duty does not impose increasing demands upon one’s time, energy, 
and resources as the number of people to whom one owes that duty 
increases. No one has ever woken up in the morning and said: ”not only do I 
have to refrain from killing Amy, I have to refrain from killing Bob and 
Carly and David and Ethel . . . There are only twenty-four hours in a day; 
how am I ever going to get all that refraining done?“ By contrast, the duty to 
offer aid does impose increasing demands on one’s time, energy, and 
resources, pretty much in direct proportion to the number of people to whom 
it is owed.101 For this reason, we cannot reasonably expect any one person to 
offer aid to everyone who might need it. Rather, our positive duty to aid is 
restricted to providing aid to a small number of people. Similar differences 
arise if we look at the situation from the other side. In order for Victim to 
enjoy his right to life and bodily integrity, it is not enough that Defendant 
refrain from killing him; Amy and Bob and Carly and David and Ethel and 
every one else must refrain from killing him. On the other hand, if Victim is 
injured and in need of medical attention, he does not need every one to aid 
him. In fact, he would probably be worse off if everyone rushed to his aid. 
                                                                                                                               
101.  This was a recurring theme in the television series Lois and Clark: the New 
Adventures of Superman. Clark’s romantic dates with Lois were disrupted when anyone, 
anywhere in the world, shouted ‘help!’ 
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What he really needs is for a few well-placed and qualified individuals to aid 
him. Thus, our negative duties tend to be relatively hard and fast; by contrast, 
it is often a lot less clear when one person owes a positive duty to another.  
Despite these differences between simple causation and prevention, 
omission, and double prevention, I think that the moral differences between 
them are not nearly as strong as Moore maintains. In particular, I find his 
argument102 that consequentialist justification is more readily available in 
cases of prevention, omission, and double prevention to be suspect. It seems 
to me that there is something right in the idea, enshrined in both the Doctrine 
of Double Effect,103 and in Kant’s Categorical Imperative,104 that there is 
something especially problematic about treating a person as a mere means. It 
is in these cases that consequentialist justification is so hard to come by, and 
these cases cut across the distinction between simple causation, and 
prevention, omission, and double prevention.  
Moore supports his claim for a moral distinction by contrasting two 
cases.105 In the first hypothetical, Defendant106 uses a rope to save three 
people from drowning instead of saving one; thus omitting to save that one. 
In the second case, one person is using a rope to get out of the water, and 
Defendant drowns him by holding his head underwater in order to take his 
rope and use it to save three others. Moore claims, correctly, the first act is 
morally justified while the second is not. He writes: “How are we to make 
sense of the moral distinction except with a metaphysical distinction between 
killing and not-saving . . . between actions causing (death) and omissions 
failing to prevent (death)?” 107  
But there is another, crucial, distinction between the two cases. Only in 
the second case is the drowning victim used as a means to save the other 
three. I think it is really this distinction that is driving our moral judgment. 
To make this clear, let us consider two new examples. First, suppose that 
Defendant is driving, and suddenly comes upon three children who are 
playing in the road. She can swerve to miss them, but in doing so, she will hit 
a fourth child, who is also playing in the road. In the full knowledge that she 
                                                                                                                               
102.  MOORE, supra note 1, at 447–49. 
103.  First formulated by Thomas Aquinas in SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7 
(1274). 
104.  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 17–20 (1785). 
105.  MOORE, supra note 1, at 448. 
106.  Moore himself in his exposition. 
107.  MOORE, supra note 1, at 448. 
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will hit and kill the one child, she swerves.108 Defendant’s action clearly 
caused the one child to die. She was in command of the vehicle that directly 
hit the child. If she had performed this action without the justification of 
avoiding the three children in the road, she would have been guilty of a grave 
moral wrong. Nonetheless, most of us think that her action was justified by 
saving the lives of three other children. This example involves simple 
causation, but consequentialist justification is available because Defendant 
did not use the one child as a means to saving the others. Now consider a 
case where Victim arrives at the emergency room of a hospital with a 
ruptured appendix. His condition is easily treatable with surgery, but without 
intervention, he will die. He is put under the care of Dr. Defendant. Dr. 
Defendant happens to have three other patients in her care, all of whom need 
organ transplants in order to survive. Dr. Defendant does not perform surgery 
on Victim, letting him die. She then uses Victim’s organs to save the lives of 
the three other patients. Even if we grant that Dr. Defendant’s omission did 
not cause Victim to die, most of us would regard her as morally responsible 
for Victim’s death. Saving three lives does not justify letting Victim die. So 
even though this is a case of omission, consequentialist justification is not 
available. 
Moore’s claim of moral difference is particularly implausible in many 
cases of double prevention.109 To consider just one more example, suppose 
that Defendant sabotages the brakes in Victim’s car. Suppose, for example, 
that he removes all of the brake fluid. Victim later dies when she is unable to 
stop her car and she collides with a truck. This is clearly a case of double 
prevention. What Defendant has literally caused, in Moore’s framework, is 
the change in location of the brake fluid. The cause of Victim’s death is the 
collision of her car with a truck. Would anyone think that Defendant’s moral 
                                                                                                                               
108.  Note the similarity to one version of the classic trolley problem. See, e.g., 
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5–
15 (1967) reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 19–32 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 
1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 THE MONIST 
204, 206–08 (1976).  
109.  I put aside here a class of cases of double prevention that Moore thinks are ‘close 
enough’ to actual causation to be treated as such for purposes of moral assessment. See 
MOORE, supra note 1, at 461–63. For example, suppose Defendant shoots Victim with a gun. 
The mechanism by which a gun fires involves double prevention. Moore claims that what 
Victim actually causes, the removal of a sear that holds back a spring, is ‘close enough’ to 
something that actually causes death, namely the movement of the spring. Id. at 462–63. 
Although I think Moore’s treatment raises some interesting problems, I will confine my 
discussion to cases in which the double prevention structure is more obvious. 
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responsibility for Victim’s death is any less for not having simply caused it? 
Would any jury of Defendant’s peers fail to convict him of murder?  
Finally, consider Moore’s third and fourth claims about preventions, 
omissions, and double preventions. Moore is certainly correct that there are 
some cases where it is unclear whether one event preempts another, stands in 
an overdetermination relation, or is simply irrelevant. John Collins110 makes 
a related point regarding prevention: sometimes it is unclear whether event A 
preempts B in preventing C, or whether because of B, C was never in danger 
of happening in the first place. But equally, I think there are cases where it is 
clear what the relations are. Suppose, as in Moore’s example that Defendant 
ties up the lifeguard, while Victim drowns. Now let us embellish the story: 
Backup would have tied up the lifeguard if Defendant had not. Or suppose 
that Backup stole Victim’s heart medicine, and Victim would have died of a 
heart attack if she hadn’t drowned first. Or suppose Victim simply misplaced 
her heart medicine, with the same effect. In all of these cases, Victim’s death 
does not counterfactually depend upon Defendant’s action, because of a 
backup double preventer. Nonetheless, in each case, Victim drowns, and it is 
Defendant’s action that stands to this drowning in a relation of double 
prevention. Defendant’s tying up the lifeguard preempts the backup double 
preventer in each of these cases. And I think that in each of these cases, we 
would hold Defendant responsible for Victim’s death to the same extent that 
we would if no backup had been present. We would not restrict Defendant’s 
liability to an inchoate liability similar to liability for attempt. Analogously, 
consider my example where Defendant sabotages Victim’s brakes. Suppose 
that if Defendant hadn’t done so, Backup would have. Or that Backup 
sabotaged Victim’s steering. Or that the steering was about to fail on its 
own.111 In each of these cases, Victim would have died even without 
Defendant’s action. Nonetheless, Defendant’s action bears the same relation 
to Victim’s death that it would have without the backup double preventer. 
And we would still hold Defendant liable, not just for the attempt, but for 
Victim’s death.  
Thus it seems to me that preventers, omissions, and double preventers 
can at least sometimes enter into relations of preemption and 
overdetermination, and that in such cases, there can be liability for the 
outcome in the absence of counterfactual dependence. More generally, I 
                                                                                                                               
110.  John Collins, Preemptive Prevention, 97 J. PHIL. 223, 223–25 (2000). 
111.  In the last two cases, imagine that Victim dies in a collision with a truck in a long, 
straight tunnel, in which she attempted to apply the brakes, but made no attempt to steer out of 
the way. Past the tunnel was a windy stretch of freeway, where Victim would have died if she 
traversed it with faulty steering. 
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think the differences between cases of simple causation, and cases of 
prevention, omission, and double prevention are not nearly as striking as 
Moore maintains. And to the extent that there are moral differences between 
them, this difference is still in need of explanation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While I have focused on sketching my own alternate conception of the 
underlying metaphysics, and have raised some challenges for Moore, I do not 
want to leave the reader with the impression that I find much of the book 
wrong-headed. On the contrary, it is thoughtful and well-argued throughout. 
There are many places where I am in almost complete agreement, such as his 
critique of the harm-within-the-risk theory, and his critique of intervening 
cause doctrines. But a litany of points of agreement would make for boring 
reading. I hope that even in voicing my objections, my discussion will 
convey to the reader some sense of the scope, ambition, and excitement of 
Professor Moore’s book. 112 
                                                                                                                               
112.  Thanks to Michael Moore and Carolina Sartorio for comments on an earlier draft. 
Thanks also to participants in the symposium on Causation and Responsibility at Rutgers 
University School of Law – Camden. 
